Order on Defendants\u27 Motion for Summary Judgment (PJ CANNON) by Bonner, Alice D.
Georgia State University College of Law
Reading Room
Georgia Business Court Opinions
2-24-2010
Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment (PJ CANNON)
Alice D. Bonner
Superior Court of Fulton County
Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/businesscourt
This Court Order is brought to you for free and open access by Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia Business Court Opinions
by an authorized administrator of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.
Institutional Repository Citation
Bonner, Alice D., "Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (PJ CANNON)" (2010). Georgia Business Court Opinions.
67.
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/businesscourt/67
... :'J 
0 
copy 
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
PJ CANNON, HENRY G. NAGEL, 
JOHN COLAGRANDE, REBECCA 
RICHEY, JEFFERY FRANKS 
(individually and on behalf of the 
Franks Family Trust), STEPHEN M. 
FILREIS, EDWARD RUTH, 
DEBORAH KENNICOTT, TURNER 
LYNN HUGHES, LESLIE 
WILLIAMS, CHARLES KELLY, 
ROGER WINANS, and 
MARK HANISEE 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
H&R BLOCK INC. a Missouri 
Corporation; RSM MCGLADREY 
BUSINESS SERVICES, INC., f/kla 
HRB Business Services, Inc., a 
Missouri Corporation, and RSM 
McGLADREY EMPLOYER 
SERVICES, INC., f/k/a 
MyBenefitsSource, a Georgia 
Corporation, 
Defendants. 
EDWARD L. CAIN, JR., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
H&R BLOCK INC., a Missouri Corporation, 
RSM MCGLADREY BUSINESS 
SERVICES, INC., f/k/a HRB BUSINESS 
SERVICES, INC., a Missouri Corporation, 
and RSM McGLADREY EMPLOYER 
SERVICES, INC., 
f/kla MYBENEFITSSOURCE, a Georgia 
Corporation, 
Defendants. 
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Civil Action File No. 2007 ·CV·13701 0 
FILED IN OFFICE 
FEB 2 42010 
DEPUTY CLERK SUPERIOR COURT 
FULTON COUNTY GA 
Civil Action File No. 2009·CV·162592 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
/ 
These cases arise out of the acquisition by Defendant RSM McGladrey Business 
Services, Inc. ("Business Services") of a controlling interest in MyBenefitSource, a 
start-up company that provided payroll processing, employee benefits, and related 
services, and which is now known as RSM McGladrey Employer Services, Inc. 
("Employer Services"). That transaction called for Business Services to acquire a 
majority of the stock in December 2001 and to acquire the remaining stock at a later 
date. To that end, Business Services and Employer Services' minority shareholders 
entered into a Shareholder's Agreement (USA") dictating the terms of the future 
purchase pursuant to a put-call provision. In addition, Employer Services option 
holders entered into Amended Stock Option Agreements which bound them to the 
terms of the SA if they opted to acquire Employer Services stock by exercising their 
I~ options so that they, too, could participate in the put-call agreement. 
I~J 
Plaintiffs are former officers and employees, and, in the case of Mr. Cain, a 
former director of Employer Services who either owned shares or held options in 
Employer Services. Business Services is an affiliate of Defendant H&R Block, Inc. 
(UHRB"). Plaintiffs allege that Defendants executed a scheme to depress the value of 
Employer Services to the benefit of HRB and HRB's other affiliates, and to the 
detriment of Plaintiffs. Among other things, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants diverted 
revenues from Employer Services to other companies under the HRB umbrella. 
Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants terminated Employer Services employees 
without cause, depressed Employer Services' stock value, and misrepresented material 
elements of the Shareholder Agreement to employees wishing to exercise their stock 
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I'J options. 
Plaintiffs' claims, found in either the Cain Complaint, the PJ Cannon Complaint, 
or both, fall into three broad categories: (1) claims asserted by minority shareholders 
including Mr. Cain who is an original founder of MyBenefitSource; (2) claims asserted 
by option holders, and (3) a claim asserted by Mr. Cain for breach of his employment 
contract. 
Minority Shareholders' Claims 
Defendants argue that the minority shareholders' claims for: (1) breach of 
contract, (2) fraud, and (3) breach of fiduciary duty are barred by the terms of the SA 
because those claims "boil down to a claim to recover what the fair market value of 
I:) their shares is or should be in their estimation." Based on this initial premise, 
Defendants argue that the SA provides the exclusive procedure for determining the 
value of all shares "put" by all minority shareholders and provides for a "final and 
binding" appraisal process, not litigation. Contract construction is a question of law for 
the court. O.C.G.A. § 13-2-1; Castellana v. Conyers Toyota, Inc., 200 Ga. App. 161, 
165 (1991). The courts finds that the independent appraisal process described in the 
SA is merely an alternative method for determining fair market value under the SA, and 
is not intended as the means by which to challenge Defendants' alleged purposeful 
misstatement or manipulation of the figures used to determine fair market value. 
iJ 
Next Defendants argue that the minority shareholders' fraud claim should be 
dismissed because the minority shareholders ratified Defendants' alleged fraud by the 
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very act of putting their shares. In contrast, Plaintiffs maintain that putting their shares 
was a mechanism through which Defendants fraud came to light and established 
Plaintiffs' injury. In support of their argument, Defendants rely on Jernigan Auto Parts. 
Inc. v. Commercial State Bank. 186 Ga. App. 267, 271 (1988), a case in which the 
Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment in favor of a bank when defendants 
"waived [the bank's] fraud and ratified the notes by their silence after they learned of 
the [bank] officer's objected-to actions and by their subsequent payments on the notes. 
Here, there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Plaintiffs waived or 
ratified Defendants' alleged fraud including whether Plaintiffs put their shares after they 
had learned fully of Defendants' alleged fraud. All such questions of material fact must 
be left for a jury to decide. 
Next Defendants argue that certain minority shareholders released their fraud 
claims. Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs Kennicott, Williams, Kelly, and 
Winans executed releases that released claims "known or unknown" in 2002-2003. 
Defendants further argue that these Plaintiffs' fraud claims accrued prior to the 
execution of those releases. However, under Georgia law, a fraud claim does not 
accrue until it is discovered and the defendant has suffered injury. Hamburger v. PFM 
Capital Management. Inc., 286 Ga. App. 382, 388 fn. 21 (2007); Nash v. Ohio Nat Life 
Ins. Co., 266 Ga. App. 416, 417(1) (2004); Green v. White, 229 Ga. App. 776, 780 
(1997); McGowan v. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co., 274 Ga. App. 483, 490 (2005). 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' claims accrued in December 2006 when they put their shares 
and were thereby allegedly injured by Defendants alleged fraud. Therefore, Plaintiffs' 
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o fraud claim asserted in this case was not among those claims released in the release 
agreements signed in 2002-2003. Moreover, those releases only released claims 
related to Plaintiffs' employment or termination of employment. Therefore, those 
releases are inapplicable to Plaintiffs' present claims as shareholders which are 
unrelated to their former employment with Employer Services. 
Option Holders' Claims 
Defendants argue that the option holders' fraud and breach of contract claims 
should be dismissed because unexercised options are unenforceable promises of 
future compensation. The Court finds that stock options are not unenforceable 
promises of future compensation, rather stock options constitute a "continuing offer" by 
(~ an employer to sell to an employee shares of the employer company at a certain price 
during a certain period of time. Langer v. Iowa Beef Packers, Inc., 420 F.2d 365, 368 
(8th Cir. 1970); see also 18B Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 1688. Whether the employee 
exercises the options and purchases shares under the terms of the options rests with 
the discretion of the employee, not the employer. 
C) 
Next, Defendants argue that the option holders' claims are too indefinite to 
support a claim for fraud. Defendants note that there are 4 option holder plaintiffs in . 
this case: Colagrande, Richey, Cannon, and Nagel, and that it is undisputed that none 
of them ever exercised their options. Defendants also note that while the option 
holders claim that they were dissuaded from exercising their options because of 
Defendants' alleged fraud, the Stock Option Agreement permitted Employer Services to 
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o buy back any stock acquired through the exercise of an option if that option holder 
departed Employer Services within 30 days of exercising the option. Defendants 
further point out that the buy-back price was not set, rather it was left to the discretion 
of Employer Services, and that all of the option holders were in the process of 
departing Employers Services when the alleged fraud occurred. Defendants then 
conclude that Employer Services' discretion to set the buy-back price renders the buy-
back provision of the Stock Option Agreement "too indefinite to support a claim for 
fraud." 
First, the Court finds that the option holders' fraud claim is not based on the buy-
back provision of the Stock Option Agreement and thus whether it is too indefinite to 
support a claim for fraud is irrelevant. It is true that under Georgia law, certain claims 
r:J may be precluded because they are based on damages that are too remote or 
speculative, e.g. claims for loss profits in certain situations. However, here, the Court 
finds that the option holders' claim that Defendants' fraud precluded them from 
(:J 
exercising their options is not too indefinite to support an award of damages. While 
requiring proof and explanation, and while subject to the rigors of cross examination 
and the rules of evidence, the Court finds that the damages the option holders seek 
could "beproved with reasonable certainty." Graham Bros. Const.Co., Inc. v. C. W. 
Matthews Contracting Co., Inc.,159 Ga. App. 546 (1981). Finally, the Court also finds 
that Defendants' argument on this point involves contingencies that did not occur. No 
one will ever be able to determine whether the buy-back provisions would have even 
come into play because the option holders never exercised their options. Therefore, 
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whether they would have exercised their options within thirty days of their departure is 
impossible to say with certainty. And even if the options holders had exercised their 
options within thirty days of their departure from Employer Services, it is also 
impossible to say with certainty that Employer Services would have decided to buy-
back those shares. The Court finds that such speculation cannot foreclose the option 
holders' claims. 
Defendants additionally argue that the option holders have no evidence of a 
misrepresentation made by Defendants so that their fraud claim fails for lack of an 
essential element. Defendants' argument assumes that the option holders' fraud claim 
is based on one misrepresentation. However, the option holders have identified 
additional misrepresentations as grounds for their fraud claim. 
Next, Defendants argue that Nagel and Cannon's fraud claim is barred by the 
statute of limitations. Under Georgia law, the statute of limitations for fraud is four 
years. Hamburger v. PFM Capital Mgmt.. 286 Ga. App. 382 (2007). Both Cannon and 
Nagel allege they were given misinformation about their stock options as they were 
departing from Employer Services and that in reliance on that misinformation they 
refrained from exercising their options. Cannon's last day of employment with 
Employer Services was on April 4,2003 and Nagel's was on June 17, 2003. Nagel and 
Cannon's claims were filed on July 13, 2007, more than four years after their claims 
accrued. In response, Nagel and Cannon argue that the deadline to exercise their 
options was extended to July 14, 2003 so that the filing of their Complaint on July 13, 
2007 was timely as it was within four years of the last date on which they could 
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o exercise their options. The Court finds the extension of that deadline irrelevant as 
Nagel's and Cannon's alleged fraud claim accrued as soon as they received 
misinformation and relied on it in refraining from exercising options, not on the last day 
that they possibly could have exercised their options. 
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' damages necessary implies a claim for lost 
profits and are thus too remote and speculative to support any recovery. The Court 
disagrees. Plaintiffs' alleged damages are tied to what their expert opines the fair 
market value of Employer Services would have been absent Defendants alleged 
wrongdoing. The Court acknowledges that undoubtedly such a calculation will be 
complex, and will likely involve differing opinions of experts, but concludes that such 
calculations are not to remote or speculative to preclude an award of damages if 
() proven. 
eJ 
Next, Defendants argue that summary judgment should be awarded to them on 
Cain's claim that he is owed at least $200,000 in severance benefits and compensation 
under the terms of his employment contract. Defendants argue that paragraph 4(c)(1) 
of Cain's employment contract unambiguously sets a condition precedent on any 
separation payments promised to Cain. Specifically, before entitlement to any 
separation payments, Cain was required to execute a Separation and Release 
Agreement ("Release") and it is undisputed that Cain never did this. Under Georgia 
law, a condition precedent must be performed before a contract becomes obligatory 
upon the other party. Roush v. Dan Vaden Chevrolet, Inc., 155 Ga. App. 372 (1980). 
However, Cain's employment contract called for him to execute a release "in a form 
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prepared" by Employer Services. In explaining his failure to execute the Release 
prepared by and presented to him by Employer Services, Cain argues that Employer 
Services refused to provide him with the Company's standard release and, instead, 
drafted a release that included all claims whether or not related to his employment, i.e. 
his shareholder claims. Cain acknowledges the condition precedent to severance 
payments provided in his employment contract and states that he is willing to sign a 
release regarding employment-related claims which is what the parties intended 
pursuant to his employment contract. In support of this argument, Cain cites examples 
of other releases used by Employer Services for other employees during the same time 
period that apply only to employment-related claims. The Court finds that there are 
questions of material fact on this issue including whether Defendants breached an 
(J implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in Cain's employment contract by drafting a 
release that included not only Cain's possible employment-related claims, but also 
claims he may have as a shareholder. 
Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' remaining claims for (1) aiding and 
abetting, (2) attorneys' fees, and (3) punitive damages depend on the existence of a 
valid underlying claim. Because all but Nagel's and Cannon's fraud claim survives 
Qefendants'motion for summary judgment, their remaining claims survive as well. 
Accordingly, summary judgment on Nagel's and Cannon's fraud claim is hereby 
GRANTED, but Defendants' remaining motion for summary judgment is DENIED. 
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\~ SO ORDERED this ?..If day of February, 2010. 
Copies to: 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Robert Shields, Esq. 
Everette L. Doffermyre, Esq. 
Samuel W. Wethern, Esq. 
Sheryl L. McCalla, Esq. 
ALICE D. BONNER, SENIOR JUDGE 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
Doffermyre Shields Canfield Knowles & Devine, LLC 
1355 Peachtree Street, Suite 1600 
Atlanta, GA 30309 
Attorneys for Defendants 
James D. Meadows, Esq. 
Matthew B. Ames, Esq. 
Balch & Bingham LLP 
30 Ivan Allen Jr. Blvd. NW, Suite 700 
Atlanta, GA 30308 
Lee H. Zell, Esq. 
Balch & Bingham LLP 
PO Box 306 
Birmingham, AL 35201 
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